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One court observed several years ago: "To the old adage
that death and taxes share an inevitable character, federal
judges may be excused for adding attorney's fees cases."1
Under the "common fund" doctrine, one accepting the benefits
of litigation prosecuted by another is equitably bound to share
proportionately in the costs of the litigation.2 The doctrine
most commonly applies in class action cases involving a mone-
tary recovery.' Although attorney fees are usually the most
significant charge against a common fund, the early cases
largely ignored the method for calculating fees.4 Recently, the
methodology for calculating fees has become increasingly
controversial.
* The author is a partner with the firm of Foster Pepper & Shefelman, and
practices primarily in complex and class litigation.
1. Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. The doctrine has its roots in the simple notion of equity that one who accepts
the benefits of litigation should share the cost of producing that benefit. In Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), the Court held that when one beneficiary of a trust
successfully sued the trustee for waste of trust assets, all beneficiaries of the trust
were bound to pay their ratable share of the fees incurred. Id. at 533-35. The Court
soon expanded the doctrine in holding that the fee request could be made by counsel
(as opposed to the client who had actually incurred the fees). Central R.R. & Banking
Co. of Georgia v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1885). In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444
U.S. 472 (1980), the Court held that the available "fund" included monies of unlocated
class members who did not actually receive the benefit upon which the common fund
fee claim was based.
3. The recovery need not be made solely through the litigation. In City of
Klawock v. Gustafson, 585 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1978), a federal official decided, as a result
of litigation brought by a city, to provide relief identical to that obtained in the
litigation to other municipalities which were similarly situated to the litigant.
Although no "fund" was created before the court, and the other municipalities were
not parties, the Ninth Circuit required the other municipalities to share in the fees
incurred by the City of Klawock in obtaining the original decision. Id. at 432.
4. In Greenough, the petitioner sought reimbursement of the fees she had actually
paid. 105 U.S. at 529. The Court did not inquire into the amount of the fee claimed. In
Pettus, the Court determined the fee by setting "reasonable compensation." 113 U.S.
at 128. It determined this amount to be 5% of the amount recovered. Id.
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Historically, common fund attorney fees were calculated
as a percentage of the fund.5 Attorney fees were thus deter-
mined almost exclusively by reference to the result obtained
by the lawyer. In response to criticisms that this method of
setting fees resulted in awards disproportionate to the efforts
expended in generating the recovery,6 trial courts shifted to fee
methodologies that instead focused on the efforts of counsel in
obtaining the recovery.7 Under these methodologies, effort was
measured by hours expended by counsel.
A growing perception exists that hourly based fee method-
ologies have their problems as well. Recently, the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Third and Ninth Circuits eval-
uated alternative fee methodologies.8 In evaluating hourly
based fee methodologies, the reports cited excessive hours,
duplicative or unjustifiable work, early settlement disincentive,
5. See Pettus, 113 U.S. at 124-25; G. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956) [hereinafter Legal
Therapeutics], cited with approval in, Mills v. Elect. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394
n.18, 396 n.24 (1970).
6. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)
[hereinafter Grinnell I], appeal following remand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Grinnell I, the trial court had awarded a 15% fee on a $10 million recovery. 495 F.2d at
452. The Second Circuit rejected the award as "excessive" and as displaying "too much
reliance on the contingent fee syndrome." Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 468. It noted that
the "bitterest complaints . . . from laymen" regarding lawyers and the legal system
concerned "windfall fees and feather bedding," all of which also resulted in criticism of
class action litigation. Id. at 469. Many of the same criticisms are now advanced
against hourly fees. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 67 (E.D. Penn.
1983).
On a subsequent appeal following remand, the court explored in greater detail its
concern with the percentage fee. Although the "lead" counsel who principally
benefitted from the percentage award had conducted brief settlement negotiations that
led to the creation of the fund, he had little to do with the actual prosecution of the
case. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1096-97, 1101. The case did not present an uncharted
excursion into legal territory or grave risk of loss, because government agencies had
previously brought cases in which much of the legal work had already been performed.
Id. at 1096, 1101.
7. See infra notes 16-17. The shift to hourly fee methodologies has not been
complete. As recently as 1984, the Supreme Court indicated that common fund fees
should be based on a percentage of the recovery:
Unlike the calculation of attorney's fees under the "common fund
doctrine" where a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed
on the class, a reasonable fee under § 1988 reflects the amount of attorney
time reasonably expended on the litigation.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (emphasis added).
8. Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108
F.R.D. 237 (1985) [hereinafter Third Circuit Report]; Ninth Circuit Committee Judicial
Conference Reference Materials, § D Report of the Attorney Fee Committee (August
19, 1987), reprinted in Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 1987 Reference Materials
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Report].
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lack of flexibility and predictability, and an increased burden
on the judicial system as disadvantages to this method of set-
ting fees.' Both reports approved the use of percentage fee
arrangements in common fund cases.
It is well known that class counsel truly manage the prose-
cution and/or settlement of class litigation. Furthermore, class
clients seldom are advised of the level of fees incurred during
the course of the litigation.' ° The only review of the hours
expended over years of litigation is at the end of the process,
when the fee applications are submitted to the court.
The premise of this Article is that common fund litigation
will be most efficiently and beneficially prosecuted if attorney
fees are awarded under a methodology that makes parallel the
interests of counsel in the fee award and of the class in the
recovery. The Article examines the historical uses of the per-
centage fee, the development of and problems with, hourly
based methods of computing fees, and the renewed trend
toward the use of percentage fee awards. It concludes that,
unlike hourly based methodologies, percentage fee arrange-
ments align the interests of counsel with the interests of both
the class and the judicial system. The judicial return to per-
centage fee arrangements is a good idea that will result in
prompt, efficient, and economic disposition of class action
litigation.
I. PERCENTAGE FEES IN THE UNREGULATED MARKETPLACE
AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
A. The Problem and the Shift to Hourly based Methodologies
Under a contingent percentage fee arrangement, a lawyer
takes a percentage of the recovery as his compensation." Such
9. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 246-49; Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8,
at 7-9.
10. The fees in a common fund case are most frequently awarded at the end of the
litigation. In the event of a class action settlement, notice of the settlement is provided
to the class. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). The notice advises the class of the terms of the
settlement. It will typically state that an award of fees and expenses will be sought,
although it seldom provides much detail concerning the fee request. For most class
members, this notice is the first and only contact they will have with the settlement of
the litigation and the fee setting process.
11. A percentage fee agreement may have a range of percentages under various
circumstances. The percentage of fee may be based on the stage of the proceedings at
which the recovery is obtained, generally increasing as the litigation progresses. The
theory of such an arrangement is that the risk, amount of lawyer time invested, and
delay in payment all increase as the case progresses, and that, therefore, a higher
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an arrangement is entrepreneurial and focuses on the results
obtained for the client, without direct consideration of the
efforts expended by counsel. Although the lawyer's efforts are
not explicitly considered in calculating the fee, an implicit
premise of percentage arrangements is that the lawyer's efforts
will be reflected in the results obtained, and by virtue of the
lawyer's self-interest, these efforts will be proportionate to the
potential recovery.' 2
Under the percentage fee method, fees in class action liti-
gation generally ranged from 20-25 percent of the recovery.
13
The percentage method of setting fees was simple in applica-
tion and also provided a measure of certainty. However, it was
perceived that percentage fee arrangements provided recov-
eries disproportionate to the efforts expended.14 Such dispro-
portion resulted from several factors, including a percentage
that was too high in light of the difficulty, risk, amount at
stake, or anticipated length of the litigation.15 A prompt dispo-
sition of the case could create the impression that counsel
labored neither long nor hard on the case, while still collecting
a substantial fee.
The courts reacted to the perception that percentage fee
awards resulted in unreasonable fees by adopting alternative
fee methodologies. These approaches are called the "Lindy"
(or "lodestar") method 6 and the "Screen Extras" method."
percentage is necessary to adequately compensate counsel. These arrangements are
referred to in this Article as "stage sliding scales." The agreement may also reduce the
percentage as the amount recovered increases. The theory of such an arrangement is
that the effort expended in obtaining any recovery will diminish proportionately as the
recovery increases, and that, therefore, a lower percentage of the upper bracket of
recovery is necessary to adequately compensate counsel. These arrangements are
referred to in this Article as "recovery sliding scales."
The Third Circuit Report recommends using both the stage and recovery sliding
scales. 108 F.R.D. at 256. This Article suggests that such arrangements may cause
more problems than they solve. See inrfra part III(B)(3).
12. In establishing or approving the percentage, counsel and the court should of
course be cognizant of the potential hours involved in prosecuting the case. As will be
explored more fully, one benefit of percentage arrangements is that they shift the risk
of excessive hours from the class to the lawyer. See infra Part III.(A).
13. See Legal Therapeutics, supra note 5, at 665. The amount can range lower. See
infra note 93.
14. See supra note 6.
15. Id. "Disproportion" is, of course, a relative concept. If the mere fact that
highly competent counsel have been retained by the class promptly results in a more
favorable attitude towards settlement by a defendant, a handsome fee to that counsel
may be appropriate. Counsel are, of course, a limited resource, and "proportion" can
only be determined by reference to market factors.
16. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard
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Because the primary concern was that the awards were out of
proportion to the efforts expended by counsel, courts devised
fee methodologies measured by the time-value 8 of those
efforts.
B. Application of Hourly Rate Methodologies
Under the Lindy formulation, the court begins the calcula-
tion of a "reasonable fee" by determining a lodestar amount.
This amount consists of the hours reasonably incurred, multi-
plied by a reasonable hourly rate. This lodestar historically
was adjusted through "multipliers" to reflect special circum-
stances of the case, including factors such as the contingent
nature of the agreement, risk of the case, quality of work,
exceptional results, and the delay in receipt of payment. Mul-
tipliers were positive (increasing the lodestar) or negative
(decreasing the lodestar).
Screen Extras involved consideration of many of the Lindy
factors, but differed somewhat in its application. No mathe-
matical formula was used; rather, the court considered the fol-
lowing factors:
(1) Time and labor required;
(2) novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(3) skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case;
(5) customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances;
(8) amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys;
(10) undesirability of the case;
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), appeal following remand, 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976).
17. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Kerr v.
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 951, (1976)
(adopting the Georgia Highway approach). The Ninth Circuit's Screen Extras and
Fifth Circuit's Georgia Highway approach are referred to in this Article as the Screen
Extras approach, because the Article deals with the Ninth Circuit's evaluation of fee
methodologies.
18. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), appeal following
remand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). As used in this Article, "time-value" is the
product of the number of hours reasonably expended by the professional multiplied by
an hourly rate.
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(11) nature and the length of the professional relation-
ship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases. 9
Based on these factors, the court sets the fee.
Although phrased differently, the Screen Extras methodol-
ogy operated much like the Lindy/lodestar approach. The first
and most important consideration under Screen Extras is the
"time and labor required."2 ° This factor closely parallels the
lodestar under Lindy. Under Screen Extras, enhancements or
reductions of the fee that reflect the remaining factors are
then made from this base.
2 1
Courts have traditionally ignored the distinctions between
fee shifting claims, by which the fee is recovered from the
opposing party in addition to the substantive recovery, and
common fund fees, where the fee is paid from the fund recov-
ered. There are, in fact, substantial differences.22 Common
fund fees are based on equitable notions of sharing litigation
costs that benefit a group of people. Statutory fee schemes, on
the other hand, are intended to encourage private enforcement
of statutory rights.23 Statutory fee shifting cases are thus not
always "group" actions, as common fund cases necessarily
are.24 In the statutory fee shifting case, there is an adversary-
the defendant-from whom the fee is sought. This is not so in
the common fund, by which the case is managed by the plain-
tiffs' counsel and the defendant has little interest in or knowl-
edge of how much of a fee is paid from the fund.25 The
amount of the common fund sets a limit on a common fund
recovery, but is also a measure of the success obtained. Statu-
tory fees, on the other hand, may exceed the amount recov-
ered; the amount recovered may not be an indicator of success
in cases of intangible rights. Although the courts have not
always distinguished the two fee situations,2 6 this Article deals
19. Georgia Highway, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
20. Id. at 717.
21. In re Manoa Finance Co., 853 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988); Wood v. Sunn, 852 F.2d
1205 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit Committee apparently perceived significant
differences between Lindy and Screen Extras. It specifically rejected Lindy, Ninth
Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 3, while recommending retention of the Screen Extras
approach as Circuit policy. Id. at 3-4.
22. 3 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 14.03 (1985).
23. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 250.
24. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 900 n.16.
25. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 251.
26. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583 n.19 (3d Cir. 1984).
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only with the common fund fee awards.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a hybrid of
Lindy and Screen Extras for calculating a "reasonable" fee in
statutory fee shifting cases.27 Under this hybrid, the lodestar is
the initial calculation; this amount "is presumed to be the rea-
sonable fee.' 28 The presumption is a "strong" one,29 from
which the court should depart only in "rare" or "exceptional"
cases.30 Adjustments to the fee should apparently occur under
the Screen Extras methodology, reflecting the Court's concern
with the use of multipliers.
II. HOURLY BASED FEE METHODOLOGIES-ALL THAT
GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD
In common fund cases, use of hourly based methodologies
has generated problems more serious than those they were
designed to resolve. These problems arise from the following:
(i) The high degree of control that counsel has over the man-
agement and disposition of class litigation; and (ii) the fact that
no client typically pays or advances the fees of counsel during
the conduct of such litigation. 1
Because hourly based fee methodologies focus on the
hours devoted by counsel, counsel's interest in managing the
litigation can result in maximizing hours and extending resolu-
tion of the litigation, as opposed to obtaining the best, quickest,
and most efficient result for the clients. Instead of the 20-25
percent recoveries under percentage fee methodologies, courts
are asked to award 40 and 50 percent in attorney fees from
27. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1986), on rehearing, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). The Third Circuit Report recognized the significant differences in common
fund cases and statutory fee shifting cases. 108 F.R.D. at 254-60.
28. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).
29. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565.
30. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901.
31. These factors are less of a problem in statutory fee shifting cases, in which the
court is asked to award a fee not from a common fund, but from the losing party. See
supra note 25. In such a case, the lawyer has typically represented a "real" client who
has made the ultimate litigation decisions, and may have paid the fees during the
course of the litigation. In addition, in a statutory fee case, the defendant has a direct
interest in limiting the amount of the fee. Cf. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)
(defendant conditioned settlement on no liability for fees). The Third Circuit Report
recommended use of percentage fee agreements in fund-in-court cases, and retention
of the Lindy approach in statutory fee cases. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 255-
56. A useful contrast in the consideration between the two situations appears in 3 H.
NEwBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 14.03 (1985).
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enormous recoveries.32 Because the common fund attorney fees
are paid from the substantive award, such high percentages sig-
nificantly reduce the recovery by class members. In addition,
the litigation may well be both prolonged and expanded,
resulting in reduced and delayed recoveries by class members.
The Third Circuit Task Force and the Ninth Circuit Com-
mittee were commissioned in response to these problems. The
Third Circuit Task Force was created to address "growing con-
cern over the perceived deficiencies and abuses of the Lindy
formulation," and to "devis[e] and articulate its view of an opti-
mum court-awarded fee system .... ,, The Ninth Circuit Com-
mittee arose out of a panel at a Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference in 1986. The committee, comprised of circuit, dis-
trict, and bankruptcy court judges, private practitioners, public
interest lawyers, and scholars, undertook "to review the proce-
dures and methods used in awarding attorney fees."'  It sur-
veyed the bench and bar for means of calculating fees and
problems in the fee area. One year later, it presented its find-
ings to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference.
After a review of the problems and abuses with Lindy, the
Third Circuit Task Force recommended as the "optimum
court-awarded fee system" use of percentage fee arrangements
in fund-in-court cases.' Although the Ninth Circuit Commit-
tee recommended retention of the Screen Extrds approach as
circuit policy, it endorsed the use of percentage agreements by
district judges comfortable with them in common fund cases.'
This section of this Article analyzes these reports and the
deficiencies of hourly based methodologies. The perceived
problem with percentage agreements was that they occasion-
ally resulted in awards inconsistent with the efforts expended
by counsel in prosecuting the claim. The shift to hourly based
methodologies has resulted in fee awards arguably more con-
sistent with the efforts of counsel, but inconsistent with the
amount recovered.
Hourly based methodologies create an incentive to manage
litigation so as to maximize the hours for which the counsel is
to be compensated. This incentive results in a substantial
32. See infra text accompanying notes 41 and 49.
33. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 253-54. It bears noting that the Lindy
methodology originated in the Third Circuit.
34. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 1.
35. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 253-54, 255.
36. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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divergence of the interests of counsel and the interests of the
class because the factors driving the fee award differ from the
factors driving the best recovery for the class. As the Third
Circuit Task Force and the Ninth Circuit Committee noted,s?
hourly based methodologies result in:
1. Churning, padding of hours, and inefficient use of
resources;
2. unnecessarily prolonged litigation;
3. artificial, unrealistic, and manipulative application of
the fee setting system;
4. lack of consistency and predictability;
5. judicial involvement in extended, burdensome and
complex litigation concerning fees; and
6. fees at higher levels than would be awarded under
percentage fee agreements.
Each of these criticisms is discussed below.
A. The Lodestar Calculation: Hours Times Rates Equals
Delay, Waste, Diminished Substantive Recoveries,
and an Added Judicial Burden
Hourly based systems are at least initially premised on the
following time-value calculation: "reasonable" hours expended
multiplied by "reasonable" hourly rates. This seemingly sim-
ple formula creates a fee system that promotes excessive hours
worked and high hourly rates.'
37. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 246-49; Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8,
at 7-9.
38. The premise of this Article-that a fee system should be used that makes the
interests of counsel and client parallel-may suggest that lawyers are only concerned
with fees, or that all lawyers take advantage of the potential for abuse under hourly
based methodologies. There is in fact a problem-there are some lawyers who take
advantage of the system. That abuse was what led to the circuit court studies. Using a
different system, which forces parallelism as opposed to conflict of attorney-client
interests, will place limits on this potential for abuse. Second, even if lawyers are
consciously devoted to their clients' interests, the conflicts inherent under hourly
based methodologies can create either (i) a subconscious desire to serve one's own, and
not one's clients', interests; or (ii) the appearance of such a conflict. Third, percentage
fees shift the risk of waste and inefficiency from the class to counsel. See infra note
94. Finally, the use of percentage arrangements will tend to decrease the costs
(economic, social, and judicial) of class litigation. If fee arrangements are to be driven
by the interests of any party, it should be the interests of the class and not of counsel.
Some have suggested that these problems can be dealt with if the court initially
sets strict guidelines for reimbursement of fees and expenses, e.g., limiting
compensation to a single attorney attending a deposition. However, this suggestion
does not deal with the inefficient litigator who prolongs a one-day deposition into
three days or who takes eight depositions when only one is necessary.
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1. A Fee Recovery Based on Hours Reasonably Expended is
Unworkable and Creates a Disincentive to Prompt
Resolution of Litigation
The conduct and resolution of the Fine Paper Antitrust
Litigation39 revealed a fee system gone awry. The decision in
that case was the driving force behind the formation of the
Third Circuit Task Force.4' Although the lawyers in the case
were successful in obtaining settlements of over fifty million
dollars, they submitted fee and expense requests totalling
twenty million dollars, or 40 percent of the recovery.41 The
trial court awarded approximately 4.3 million dollars in fees
and 1.1 million dollars in expenses, slashing the applications by
nearly 75 percent.42
The decisions reveal, in gory detail, the serious abuses pos-
sible when fees are awarded under hourly based methodolo-
gies. They set forth a catalogue of horrors including: (i)
management of litigation by committees of lawyers;43 (ii) allo-
cation of work through systems of patronage and Self-dealing,
in which favors were granted in the form of assignment of
responsibility for lucrative tasks or acquiescence in the hours
claimed by others;' (iii) padding of hours;45 (iv) assigning mul-
tiple lawyers to perform the work of one;' (v) use of partners
to do work more suitable for clerks or paralegals;47 and (vi)
undertaking tasks that consumed enormous amounts of time
but were of little utility or value to the class." The debacle in
Fine Paper was by no means unique or unprecedented.49
Cases involving multiple counsel result in the greatest
39. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), oqff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
40. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 246.
41. Fine Paper I, 751 F.2d at 570-71. Fee petitions consumed 27 feet of pleadings.
Id, at 601 n.1. Fee hearings were held on 41 days. Id. at 571.
42. Id. at 575.
43. Fine Paper I, 98 F.R.D. at 70.
44. Id. at 71, 172; Fine Paper II, 751 F.2d at 573.
45. E.g., Fine Paper 1, 98 F.R.D. at 75, 178; Fine Paper II, 751 F.2d at 578.
46. Fine Paper II, 751 F.2d at 573.
47. Fine Paper, 98 F.R.D. at 91.
48. Id. at 75-76. There were approximately 97,000 hours billed to the class. Id. at
70. About 85,000 of these hours (over 85% of the total) were spent after the original
settlements (which comprised $30 million of the total of $50 million) were reached. Id.
49. Another example of abuse under Lindy (albeit in the context of a statutory
fee award for a prevailing party) is Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262
(3d Cir. 1985), a case challenging a city's negligent destruction of a house valued at
$2,700. Counsel devoted 245 hours to discovery in the case, which was simple and
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abuses under hourly based methodologies. The case "manag-
ers" permit overstaffing and excessive hours because the fee
recovery is not capped by a fixed percentage of the recovery,
but is instead limited only by the amount of the recovery.
Thus, hourly based methodologies permit, if not encourage,
multiple claims for the same work. Under those methodolo-
gies, counsel have an incentive to enter the case at every stage
of the proceedings, even after substantial progress toward reso-
lution of the case has been made.' Express or implicit agree-
ments to maximize fees result in innumerable layers of
committee structure and bureaucracy. In Fine Paper, some
forty-one private law firms submitted claims for compensa-
tion.51 Some entered the case after a substantial number of the
defendants had settled, and the class was already over-repre-
sented; nearly 88 percent of the hours claimed were recorded
after the initial settlements were reached. 2
A less frequently discussed problem is that of well-inten-
tioned but inefficient counsel. Under hourly based methodolo-
gies, the class presumptively assumes the risk of inefficiency.
This is because it is difficult for the court, based on a review of
time records and a brief submitted by counsel, to determine
whether a deposition was efficiently conducted or whether the
discovery in question was necessary or of benefit to the class.
Hourly based methodologies encourage counsel to record
increased hours, and to ignore hard judgments about whether
and how the work should be done. Whether these hours were
reasonable or necessary is not determined until it is too late-
at the conclusion of the litigation when the work has already
straightforward. The Third Circuit reversed the district court's significant reduction
of the fee requested, compensating all hours claimed for a $35,000 fee recovery.
In a recent class action case involving a $13.8 million settlement, Chief Judge
Richard M. Bilby, Chair of the Ninth Circuit Committee, recommended (as a special
master) a fee and expense award of $5.4 million (38.9% of the settlement) based on a
request for $5.8 million (42% of the settlement). In re Seafirst Litig., No. C83-771R
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 1987) (Minute Order). Judge Bilby's fee recommendation was in
the alternative, using both the Screen Extras hourly based analysis and a percentage of
the recovery. No percentage was negotiated at the outset of the case. Judge Bilby also
used a recovery sliding scale that increased as the recovery went up. He did so based
on a finding that plaintiffs had recovered more than the reasonable settlement value of
the case. Id. at 2. On review, the district court reduced the award of fees and expenses
to $4.35 million (31.5% of the settlement). Naye v. Boyd, No. C83-771R (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 22, 1988) (as amended March 8, 1988).
50. See, e.g., Fine Paper I, 98 F.R.D. at 170. See also supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
51. Fine Paper 1, 98 F.R.D. at 86-228.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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been performed. These factors not only create a disincentive
to manage litigation efficiently, but place the court in the diffi-
cult position of second-guessing counsel and disallowing hours
after a substantial result has been obtained.
0
2. Reasonable Rates May Not be Reasonable, Predictable, or
Reflective of the Value of the Service Rendered
The divergence in interests between the class and counsel
under hourly based methodologies also appears in the determi-
nation of reasonable hourly rates. An hourly based methodol-
ogy creates an incentive for attorneys with high billing rates
(i.e., senior partners) to perform tasks for which their skills,
training, expertise, and associated billing rates are not
needed. 3 Hourly based methodologies create no incentive
(other than ex post facto court review) to make the highest and
best use of the human resources available. Instead, they
encourage use of the professional with the highest billing rate
the court will or might allow to undertake the task.' If suc-
cessful, this inefficiency reduces the recovery by the class.
A variety of methods of setting hourly rates are used.
Some courts assign hourly rates lawyer-by-lawyer.' Other
courts look to the status of a lawyer within a firm-e.g., part-
ner or associate.- Others assign a rate based on the function
performed-e.g., trial attendance or document review.
Whether the rate is set by individual, status, or function,
courts have struggled with determining "reasonable rates in
the community."'  In determining a rate for a particular attor-
53. Again, Fine Paper I provides the example of senior partners who submitted
claims for time spent copying documents. Fine Paper 1, 98 F.R.D. at 178.
54. E.g., Fine Paper II, 751 F.2d at 591-92.
55. See, e.g., Edmonds v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 1126, 1138-39 (D.S.C. 1987).
56. See, e.g., Fine Paper I, 98 F.R.D. at 83. The court also considered the
experience, reputation, practice, and qualifications of the associates and partners in the
firm. Id. at 83 n.21.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1988); Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1982).
58. A recurring and troublesome issue is deciding for which community the
determination of reasonableness of rates is made. The options appear to include the
forum community standards, the attorney's home community standard (assuming
counsel does not ordinarily practice in the forum community), and a national standard.
See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
The Third Circuit Report recommends using established rates in accordance with
those prevailing in the forum. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 261. The Ninth
Circuit Committee recommended use of the attorney's "normal" rate. Ninth Circuit
Report, supra note 8 at 3.
A similar question is whether historic or current hourly rates should be used.
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ney, the court considers a myriad of subjective factors, includ-
ing the attorney's "standard" rate, her performance in the case,
academic and professional background and experience, stand-
ing and reputation in the community, the difficulty or novelty
of the issue presented, and the degree of contingency presented
by the case. 59 An individual attorney may have several billing
rates, depending on the client, subject matter, and means and
regularity of payment. Rates will increase over the course of
the lawsuit. Some lawyers will have a special rate for class
action or contingent work. Others will have no rate at all,
because all of their work is on a contingent fee basis.'
Under hourly based methodologies, counsel select a rate at
the end of the case, at which point the rate may be applied to
thousands of hours. Thus, the mere selection of the rate pro-
vides significant opportunities for manipulation of an hourly
based fee system. In addition, it requires the court to scruti-
nize extensively the fee request and the background and prac-
tice of the claiming lawyer.
Thus, the consideration of hourly rates in an hourly based
methodology necessarily leads to many of the same problems
as the initial hours to be credited determination. It creates a
disincentive for efficient use of resources and exacerbates the
counsel/class conflict.
3. Multipliers Multiply the Problem
Similarly, the potential for increases to the time-value,
whether through Lindy's multipliers or consideration of the
Screen Extras factors, aggravated the problems outlined above.
The temptation to pad or churn was made greater by the
potential for multiple hourly rate recoveries. Equally trouble-
some was that the factors overlapped, resulting in the possibil-
Some courts have determined time-value based on only historic rates on the theory
that such rates reflect the value of the service at the time it was rendered. Most make
the calculation based on current rates, to compensate for delay in receipt of payment
(interest) and lost purchasing power through inflation. Compare Copper Liquor, Inc.
v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1096 n.26 (5th Cir. 1982) (prevailing practice is to
use current rates) with New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136,
1153 (2d Cir. 1983) (should use historic rates in civil rights cases).
The appropriate considerations for determining hourly rates are beyond the scope
of this Article.
59. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
60. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1803 (1984
Supp.).
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ity of duplicative credit for the same aspects of the fee
entitlement. For example, under Screen Extras, the first factor
considered is the "time and labor required,"6' that is, time
spent multiplied by hourly rates. The court was to make
adjustments to this figure based upon factors such as novelty
and difficulty of the question involved. 2 However, the novelty
and difficulty of the issues are theoretically already reflected
in the first factor-the time and labor required to develop and
present the case. 3 Similarly, factors such as the level of skill
required to perform the service properly and the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys involved will be
reflected in the hourly rate used in the time and labor required
calculation.64
The Supreme Court substantially restricted the available
multipliers because of the duplicative nature of the factors con-
sidered.' The effect of these decisions is to make the lodestar
calculation the presumptive "reasonable fee," 66 with little pros-
pect of enhancement through multipliers.
One of the few surviving multipliers is for the contingency
of receiving attorney fees.67 This factor theoretically compen-
sates counsel for the risk that the case will be unsuccessful and
no fee will be paid at all. However, some cases deny "risk"
multipliers where the litigation, although beneficial, was
highly speculative and not of the sort courts wish to
encourage.' Noting the inverse effect of risk multipliers-the
61. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
64. The same problem of overlapping factors arises with use of multipliers under
Lindy. Factors such as quality or difficulty of the questions presented are largely
compensated in the lodestar calculation.
65. E.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 868, 899 (1984) (upward adjustments restricted
to "rare cases in which the success was 'exceptional' "); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424 (1983).
66. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
564-65 (1986), on rehearing, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
67. In Delaware Valley, a statutory fee shifting case, the Court rejected
application of a contingency multiplier on the record before it. 107 S. Ct. at 3089, 3091.
However, a majority of the justices held that Congress intended to permit contingency
multipliers. Id. at 3089 (concurring opinion); Id. at 3092-94 (dissenting opinion).
Another factor for which enhanced compensation may be available is delay in
receipt of payment. An attorney who is not paid for five or six years of litigation has
lost interest, been forced to extend capital, and may suffer from loss of purchasing
power through inflation. This factor is usually compensated in the lodestar
calculation, through the use of current hourly rates, as opposed to use of multipliers.
See supra note 58.
68. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 235-37 (2d Cir. 1987).
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flimsier the case, the higher the fee-these cases suggest that
risk multipliers encourage "strike suits" of questionable
merit.69
The Ninth Circuit Committee took the position that in the
event of a quick settlement, the court should focus more on
the result obtained than on the time taken to obtain that
result.70 The Committee's view seemed to be that courts, in
applying hourly based methodologies, have under-utilized mul-
tipliers to reward counsel for a prompt disposition of a case:
The problem of achieving an adequate fee award for the
skilled litigator who rapidly and efficiently concludes a case
is even more challenging. The Committee expresses a spe-
cial concern that in some instances, however great the law-
yer's accomplishments or outstanding the result, unless a
substantial amount of lawyer's hours have been involved in
producing that result there is a disposition by the courts to
predicate fees on time rather than accomplishment. The
effect of such a judicial approach, sanctioned by numerous
appellate decisions dealing with lodestars and the reluctant
acceptance of multipliers, creates a disposition on the part of
lawyers to make certain that enough hours are logged to
warrant a substantial fee. Obviously, this motive can be
incompatible with the [objectives of] Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule No. 1 [the speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action]. 7 '
In practical terms, and in light of recent precedent, a court
is unlikely to triple a fee award as a result of a prompt disposi-
tion. The recent trend away from multipliers, together with
the fact that an important factor in adopting hourly based
methodologies was overcompensation of counsel in quick cases,
leave considerable uncertainty surrounding implementation of
that recommendation.
Multipliers tend to enhance the perception that hourly
based fee methodologies are subject to manipulation,72 and lack
69. Id.; Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). See generally, Note, Attorney's Fees Contingency
Enhancements: Toward a Complete Incentive to Litigate Under Federal Fee Shifting
Statutes, 63 WASH. L. REV. 469 (1988); Note, Non-Payment Risk Multipliers: Incentives
or Windfalls, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1074 (1986).
70. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 9.
71. Id. One case that did not award a prompt disposition is In re Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (2.48 multiplier based, in part, on
early settlement initiatives).
72. District courts may use multipliers to manipulate the fee to arrive at what the
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certainty in their application. 73 These three issues-the hours
to be compensated, the rates to be used, and the use of multi-
pliers--all affect the amount of the fee. Yet there are other,
less quantitative problems with hourly based methodologies.
B. Settlement Conflicts
Hourly based methodologies create ethical problems when,
for example, a defendant includes in a settlement offer a spe-
cific fee recovery or a limitation on fees. Although courts have
frowned on such simultaneous merits/fee discussions,7 4 the
Supreme Court has held that a defendant can condition a set-
tlement offer on an absolution of liability for fees.7" The ethi-
cal concern is that the lawyer may place his interest in the fee
recovery ahead of the interest of the class in maximizing the
recovery.
The conflict, if recognized, tends to discourage settlement.
A defendant may legitimately seek to limit or obtain informa-
tion regarding its total liability before entering a settlement.
Limitations on such discussions make settlements more diffi-
cult because they restrict the scope of discussion, information
that can be exchanged, and the boundaries of agreement.
C. Court Involvement in Fee Applications
Despite admonitions that a "request for attorney's fees
should not result in a second major litigation,""6 that is pre-
cisely what occurs under hourly based methodologies. This
extensive litigation over fees is not only a burden to the court,
but it delays distribution of the common fund to class mem-
bers.7 7 Enhanced fee litigation occurs in large part because the
court believes is an appropriate percentage fee. Cincinnati Gas, 643 F. Supp. at 149
(application of 2.48 multiplier yields a fee of exactly 15% of the recovery). Although
this Article supports use of percentage arrangements, that use should be open, as
opposed to sub silentio, and prospective, as opposed to retroactive.
73. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 9.
74. E.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
75. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). In large part, the Court was concerned
with hindering settlement of litigation. Id. at 732-36.
76. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 868, 902 n.19 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 432 (1983)).
77. This can be indirectly confirmed by examining the length of time it takes to
resolve the fee claim, or the complexity of the decisions awarding fees. The decision
on fees in Fine Paper, for instance, ran nearly 200 pages. See Fine Paper I, 98 F.R.D.
at 48-237. The decision in Agent Orange, including the appendix, was 99 pages long.
See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296-395 (1985).
The extended fee litigation that so characterizes hourly based fee petitions was
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fee proceedings occur after the recovery by the class is deter-
mined. The court is required to review (typically for the first
time) submissions based on perhaps thousands of time entries
(assuming time has been recorded) spanning a period of years.
It is too late to prevent wasted hours or misallocated work, and
the court is reduced to reviewing the petition and denying the
hours claimed for such work. Counsel, with the benefit of
hindsight, will prepare an application based at least in part on
the result obtained.
The potentially crushing burden on the court created by
hourly based fee applications was made clear by the Agent
Orange case.7" Counsel submitted a fee and expense recovery
of $10.7 million dollars from a $180 million dollar award. The
petitions for fees and expenses numbered 121 and filled two
five-drawer legal-sized filing cabinets.79 The initial review was
performed by five law clerks, who worked full time for three
months, and the review consumed "thousands of court-person-
nel hours."' The court resorted to percentage reductions for
some classes of work, as opposed to an item-by-item or lawyer-
by-lawyer review."'
This burden, to produce a ruling on what Justice Brennan
has described as "one of the least socially productive types of
litigation imaginable,"8 2 is one of the major defects of hourly
based methodologies.
D. The Circuit Courts Suggest a Return
to Percentage Agreements
After reviewing these problems, the Third Circuit Task
Force recommended using a percentage fee agreement accepta-
ble to both class counsel and the court.83 The Third Circuit
foreshadowed in Lindy itself. In Lindy, the fee litigation consumed four years.
Compare 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (initial fee decision) with 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976) (final decision regarding fees). Most of the claims on the merits were filed
in 1969 and 1970, and were resolved in two years, between 1969 and 1971. See
Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F.
Supp. 364, 379-80 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (Appendix). Thus, funds recovered under the
settlement on behalf of the class giving rise to the fee requests by counsel were not
distributed until after resolution of the fee award some five years later.
78. 611 F. Supp at 1318, 1319.
79. Id at 1319.
80. Id. at 1321.
81. Id. at 1320-21.
82. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
83. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 255.
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Report recommended that such an agreement be negotiated
"at the earliest practicable moment," using an independent
attorney to represent the putative fund beneficiaries in the
negotiations." The independent party is to negotiate the fee
agreement "in an open and appropriately arm's length [trans-
action] ... in the usual marketplace manner and submit the
proposal for the court's approval."' s
In cases involving multiple plaintiffs' lawyers or conflict-
ing claims of lawyers, the beneficiaries' judicially appointed
representative might be asked to make a recommendation to
the court based on both the economic considerations and the
anticipated effectiveness of representation." The report sug-
gests that the fee agreements in most cases should include:
[A] sliding scale dependent upon the ultimate recovery,
the expectation being that, absent unusual circumstances,
the percentage will decrease as the size of the fund
increases. In order to promote early settlement, the negoti-
ated fee also could provide a percentage or fixed premium
incentive based on how quickly or efficiently the matter was
resolved.s7
The report suggests a "safety valve" to depart from an
agreement that, in application, seems unfair 8s The members
of the Task Force expressed disagreement, however, over
when such a safety valve could be employed.89
The Ninth Circuit Committee was less detailed in its rec-
ommendations. All of the judges on the Committee had
encountered problems with fee applications in common fund
cases, particularly those cases of some duration.' Although it
84. The report does not define "earliest practicable moment" but assumes that it
means after the pleadings are closed but before discovery is "fully" underway. 1d. at
255 n.60. Some of the members of the Task Force felt that it was appropriate to delay
negotiating agreement until the case was "better formed." Id. at 255 n.62.
85. Id. at 256.
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted). Judge Bilby, chair of the Ninth Circuit
Committee, recently recommended use of a sliding scale that increased the percentage
as the amount of recovery increased, based on his view that counsel settled the case for
more than it was worth. See supra note 49.
88. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 257.
89. Id.
90. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 11. In cases governed by Screen Extras,
the Ninth Circuit Committee suggested that the court monitor hours as the case
progresses by requiring periodic submissions of time records. Id. at 11-12. These
submissions, on an ex parte and confidential basis, would seem highly problematical. If
the district judge closely monitors and uses the reports, there is a legitimate concern
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did not adopt "as Circuit policy" a departure from Screen
Extras, it noted the particular problems under hourly based
methodologies when the interests of counsel and the class are
not parallel:
In the course of our deliberations we noted on numerous
occasions that at times tensions arise between the attorneys'
interest in a basis for adequate fees and "the just speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action" called for by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. That tension arises
because in some instances, however great the lawyers'
accomplishments or outstanding the result, unless a substan-
tial amount of lawyers' hours have been involved in produc-
ing that result, there is a disposition by the courts to
predicate fees on time rather than accomplishment. The
effect of such a judicial approach, sanctioned by numerous
appellate decisions dealing with lodestars and the reluctant
acceptance of multipliers, creates a disposition on the part of
lawyers to make certain that enough hours are logged to
warrant a substantial fee....
While the courts' review of fee applications can address
this problem, a tension exists because the fee award results
tend to emphasize hours worked (the tradesmen aspect of
lawyering), to the detriment of results accomplished (the
artisan aspect of lawyering). Further, this tension may cause
courts to be more involved in the fee setting process than is
desirable.
In view of the foregoing, the Committee has recom-
mended that the district courts in the Ninth Circuit be
encouraged to be innovative in the development of pre-nego-
tiated contingent fee arrangements. To that end we endorse
the concept set forth in Part 3 of the Third Circuit recom-
on the part of defendants about ex parte reports by plaintiffs on the status of the case.
If the reports are not regularly reviewed, they would seem to be of little use. The
alternative would be to have another judge review the reports, which hardly seems
efficient.
In a recent recommendation on a fee award, Judge Bilby of the Committee
recommended a fee award based alternatively on hourly rate and percentage
calculations. The percentages used (29% on the first $9.25 million of the recovery and
33% on the last $4.65 million -)f the recovery) were not negotiated beforehand. The
result was a fee recommendation of $4.22 million, or 30.5% of the total $13.9 million
recovery. On review, the district court rejected Judge Bilby's use of a percentage fee
without consideration of the Screen Extras factors. Naye v. Boyd, No. C83-771R at 2-3
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 1988) (Order re Attorneys' Fees). Applying the Screen Extras
factors, it awarded a fee of $3.36 million, or 24.3% of the recovery. Id. (amended
March 8, 1988).
1988]
62 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 12:43
mendations to those judges who feel comfortable in trying
such arrangements. 91
The Committee felt it improper for the trial judge to be
involved in the negotiation process, and recommended use of a
magistrate "or other designated representative."'9 2
The Third and Ninth Circuit Court reports identified some
of the serious deficiencies in hourly based methodologies.
Hourly based methodoligies have caused more serous problems
than they were formulated to solve. These problems--from
the amount of fees claimed, to the management of the litiga-
tion, to the involvement of the court-would be remedied by
the use of percentage fee arrangements approved at the outset
of the case. However, certain changes are appropriate in the
approach outlined by the courts.93
III. A WORKABLE PERCENTAGE FEE SYSTEM
A. Percentage Fee Agreements Offer Economic
and Social Advantages
A fixed percentage fee arrangement provides parallelism
between the interests of counsel and the class. Because the
lawyer gets a percentage of the recovery of class members, her
interest in the best net recovery (i.e., the amount of the fee,
reduced to present value) for her fee will be achieved by get-
ting the best net recovery for the class. This Article recognizes
91. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 8, 10.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Because of the long lead time between filing of a class action case and
published decisions on attorney fees, there are few reported decisions that fully
implement the circuit court recommendations. There is, however, a definite trend in
the decisions toward use of percentage arrangements. See, e.g., Brown v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1988) (approving non-negotiated fee of 16.5%
based on Screen Extras); Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 675 F.
Supp. 707 (D. Mass. 1987) (approving fee of 26% of the recovery based on negotiated
fee agreement that was published to the class); Howes v. Atkins, 668 F. Supp. 1021
(E.D. Ky. 1987) (40% fee awarded; hourly based recovery would have consumed
common fund in its entirety); In re GNC Shareholder Litig., 668 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (25% fee); Edmonds v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 1126 (D.S.C. 1987) (court
approved request of 5% of recovery while finding that 10% would have been
reasonable); In re Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. Secur. Litig., 643 F. Supp. at 152 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (15% fee). See 3 H. NEWBERG, CLASS AcTiONS § 14.03 (1985). With the
exception of Pavlidis, these percentages were not negotiated at the onset of the case.
Despite the court's use of a percentage in Cincinnati Gas, 643 F. Supp. at 152, it is
unclear whether the fee was awarded on a percentage basis or under a Lindy
approach. The court performed a Lindy analysis, compensating all time at the
requested rates with a uniform 2.48 multiplier to arrive at an award that was exactly
15% of the total. Id. at 153.
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that class counsel actually manage class litigation. The benefi-
cial effect of the parallel interest of a percentage arrangement
is that if counsel is consciously or subconsciously self-con-
cerned about maximizing the fee-be it from the perspective of
risk, amount, or timing-that concern will result in the same
judgment about the recovery for the class. This parallelism of
interest encourages management of litigation to the benefit of
the class and the judicial system.
Under a percentage fee arrangement, litigation is managed
based on a "fixed budget"-that is, because the percentage is
established at the outset, excessive lawyer hours do not
increase the fee. Instead, excessive hours increase the "cost"
(in the form of uncompensated hours) to the lawyers-if the
case is won, they receive a lower profit; if the case is not won,
they receive no recovery on a greater number of hours. Per-
centage agreements thus create an incentive to make the high-
est and best use of legal resources. Partners will not review
documents if the fee is fixed and if an associate or legal assis-
tant could do the work. More importantly, if counsel conducts
the litigation inefficiently, the class does not pay more.94
This fixed budget will result in pursuit of various facets of
the litigation (motions, discovery, trial) only if counsel believes
it will substantially benefit the class to do so. Cases will be
tried or settled based on counsel's self-interested analysis of
the risk, delay, and expense of trial compared to the potential
recovery for the class. Discovery will be sought if it is needed
to obtain information or to create a record, not simply to churn
more hours. To maximize these benefits, the percentage fee
arrangements should be established at the outset of the case:
only then will the need for efficient case management be clear.
Using percentage arrangements will also reduce litigation
over fees. Percentage fees are simple of calculation, and do not
require the mind-numbing sifting of thousands of time entries,
evaluating each for the reasonableness of the time spent,
whether the service benefitted the class, and the reasonable-
ness of the rate charged. In addition, fees are determined at
the outset of the case, and not based on ex post facto review.
All of these factors represent an efficient management
approach that focuses on the true issues of the case. Disposi-
94. Pavlidis, 675 F. Supp. at 712 (although inexperienced counsel spent "wholly
inappropriate amounts of time" on certain matters and there was duplication of effort,
these factors do not weigh heavily in percentage arrangements).
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tion of the case on the substantive (not fee) merits will serve to
reduce the economic cost of class action litigation.
There are, however, non economic benefits to percentage
arrangements as well. Percentage agreements provide cer-
tainty and a limit as to the portion of the recovery that will be
consumed by fees.95 This permits notice of the amount of the
fee to the class from the outset. 6 This information will be of
particular value in opt-out classes certified under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), for class members will know, when
making a decision whether to opt out, how much of any recov-
ery will be consumed by fees.
The conflict presented by simultaneous substantive and
fee settlement discussions largely disappears under percentage
fee arrangements.97 Since the fee arrangement will have been
reached at the outset, counsel need not negotiate anything
other than the total recovery. Thus any conflict between coun-
sel's potential fee recovery and the substantive recovery will
not arise.
Percentage arrangements should also result in more
prompt distribution of a recovery to the class. Under hourly
based methodologies, the most common way for fees to be paid
is for the fee to be determined, deducted from the common
fund, and then both the fee and the balance of the fund distrib-
uted. This requires determination of the precise amounts of
the fund and fees and expenses before distribution of the fund.
When the ultimate size of the fund is in question (because of
resolution of remaining claims or defendants) or the size of the
fee claim is in question (because of the application process or
remaining work to be done), the only alternative under hourly
based methodologies is to delay distribution or to dismiss the
remaining claims.98
Use of percentage fees, on the other hand, permits staged
distributions, on a class member-by-class member or claim-by-
claim basis. The appropriate percentage is simply deducted
95. There is not certainty, of course, as to the ultimate amount of the fee. Note
that hourly based methodologies will not produce certainty as to either the ultimate
amount of the fee or percentage of the recovery that the fee will constitute.
96. Eg., Pavlidis, 675 F. Supp. at 711.
97. See Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 5-6. See supra part II(B).
98. In Lindy, for instance, it appears that the distribution to the class was not
made until after the five years between the settlement and the final ruling on fees.
See supra note 77 and Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator




from the amount distributed.9 9 In a case involving multiple
substantive claims or multiple defendants, 10 0 such distributions
might occur when some, but not all, claims are resolved. A dis-
tribution to some, but not all, plaintiffs is also possible.1 0 ' This
ability to distribute on an interim or partial basis is an impor-
tant and flexible advantage of percentage fees.
In short, percentage fee arrangements offer significant
economic and social advantages to fee awards under hourly
based methodologies. They provide certainty, notice, and ease
of administration. Because they can be implemented at the
outset of the litigation, percentage agreements create an incen-
tive for efficient, self-interested management of litigation.
They reduce litigation over fees. They shift the risk of ineffi-
ciency from the class to counsel. All of these factors should
result in lower costs for the class, as well as defendants and
the judicial system.
Weighed against these benefits is the possibility of
overcompensating counsel for a quick result. However, the
hourly based experience has shown that "quick results" sel-
dom occur if the alternative-fees based on hours-is used.1
0 2
Furthermore, a prompt settlement may reflect a strong case.
In the strong case, the solution is to use a low percentage, not
to convert to an hourly based fee.
B. Considerations in Reaching a Percentage
Fee Arrangement
Although the circuit court recommendations are an
improvement on hourly based methodologies, they neverthe-
less deal inadequately with certain practical problems in nego-
tiating and implementing percentage fee agreements. This
section explores those problems and proposes solutions to
them.
The method proposed herein is for counsel to submit a
99. Edmonds v. United States, 658 F. Supp 1126, 1133 n.14 (D.S.C. 1987)
(distribution of class member share, subject to 5% withholding for fees).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits partial judgments on fewer than all of the
claims presented or against fewer than all defendants.
101. Such a situation might occur when there are subclasses with claims resolved
at different times, when the parties dispute the amount due particular plaintiffs, when
a plaintiff cannot be located, or when delays in processing claims affect some, but not
all, plaintiffs.
102. In Fine Paper, for example, over 88% of the hours recorded (85,000 out of
97,000) occurred after the major initial settlements were reached. 98 F.R.D. at 70.
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percentage arrangement with the complaint, stating the lowest
percentage under which counsel will prosecute the case. The
percentage should be a "drop-dead" figure, with no renegoti-
ation during class certification normally allowed. °3 The agree-
ment should ordinarily provide for a single percentage for the
entire recovery regardless of when obtained, although sliding
scales of percentages may be used when appropriate. The
court should review the agreement, or if necessary, appoint an
independent third party to meet with counsel and discuss the
basis for the proposed arrangements. The agreement should
specifically describe the work to be done, including any alloca-
tion of work among firms. The court may be called upon to
allocate responsibility if there are conflicting claims to
representation.
1. Negotiation of the Agreement After Commencement of
the Action
Both circuit court reports recommended use of post-filing
negotiation of fee arrangements. The Third Circuit Task Force
recommended a process taking place early in the case, perhaps
as soon as after the close of the pleadings.1°4 The Ninth Circuit
Report suggests use of a designated representative to negotiate
such an agreement at the "earliest possible time,"'0 5 also con-
templating post-filing negotiation of the agreement.
Negotiation after the filing of the case presents substantial
practical problems. One of the primary benefits of percentage
fee arrangements is that they provide certainty and predict-
ability. That certainty and predictability, however, also involve
entrepreneurial risks and assessments by counsel. These fac-
tors, while beneficial for case management purposes once the
agreement is in place, tend to create problems in the mid-case
(or even early-case) negotiation of a fee arrangement.
Prior to starting a class action, counsel is required to meet
with the clients, research the facts and law,"° develop a theory
of the case, counsel the clients on whether to proceed, prepare
pleadings (more than likely including a motion for class certifi-
103. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
104. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 255 n.62. Some of the judges on the task
force would avoid negotiating an agreement at the pleading stage of the case,
preferring to wait until the case was "better formed." Id.
105. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 10.
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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cation with supporting materials), °7 file the case, and deal
with motions to dismiss or discovery matters (on the merits or
regarding class certification). Preliminary injunctive relief
may be sought. Appeals may be sought from rulings on any of
the aforementioned items.
Each of the steps described can be a very substantial
undertaking in major class litigation. Under hourly based
methodologies, there was relative certainty regarding the basis
for compensation, because the attorney knew her hourly rates,
and could expect to recover for her time at that rate or even a
multiple thereof. But, under the post-filing negotiation
approach, counsel is asked to undertake considerable responsi-
bility and expend significant resources without any idea of the
ultimate fee arrangement for the case. If the fee cannot be
"negotiated" (post-filing) to counsel's satisfaction, the class
may be left without counsel, or a very substantial amount of
work and enterprise by counsel may be wasted or unrewarded.
Taking a case on a percentage basis as opposed to an
hourly basis involves much greater subjective judgment on the
part of the lawyer.'0° If counsel is to make the entrepreneurial
judgment about whether a case is worth taking, he needs to
know the percentage involved. Under the circuit proposals,
counsel will be forced to incur tens (if not hundreds) of
thousands of dollars in time and expenses without any idea of
the ultimate stakes.
By submitting an agreement with the complaint, counsel
at least presumptively creates an acceptable arrangement.
Such an arrangement could be based on negotiations with class
members." 9 Upon presentation, the arrangement should be
107. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1) requires that the motion for class certification be filed
as "soon as practicable after the commencement of an action." District court rules
may require filing the motion within a fixed period of time. See U.S. DIST. CT. R.
23(f)(3) (W.D. Wash.) (90 days). The United States Claims Court requires the motion
to be filed with the complaint. U.S. CL. CT. R. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. 228 (1968).
108. The analogy in the construction industry is a fixed price bid as opposed to a
time and materials bid. Few contractors would agree to begin work on a fixed price
contract without knowing the ultimate price. The Ninth Circuit described the contrast
as between the "artisan aspect of lawyering" and "the tradesman aspect of lawyering."
Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 8.
109. The assumption that class representatives are unable in all cases to
adequately represent the class in fee negotiations is without foundation. Particularly
in securities, antitrust, or representation of white collar employees, class
representatives may be sophisticated individuals or institutions. Class members may
have interests of which the court or counsel are unaware, but that can be dealt with in
negotiations.
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promptly reviewed by the court, or if it deems necessary, by an
independent representative. 110 In many cases, the reasonable-
ness of the fee will be apparent on its face. The agreement
should be either rejected or accepted as reasonable, but ordina-
rily should not be renegotiated."' The nonnegotiability of the
fee will encourage counsel to state, in the proposed agreement,
the lowest percentage acceptable to complete the work. If
counsel still proposes too high a percentage, the court may
reject the proposal and counsel loses the representation.
2. Setting the Percentage
The Third Circuit Report does not set forth in detail how
the percentage should be set. Instead, it indicates that the per-
centage should be negotiated "in the usual marketplace man-
ner . . . in the same fashion as would any other attorney in a
comparable situation. ' 11 2  Historically, there has been little
explicit discussion of how to calculate the appropriate percent-
age in advance of the litigation. Professor Hornstein observed
that fees set by percentage commonly ran 20-25 percent of the
award.
113
The Third Circuit suggested that the following factors
would affect the percentage:
[T]he amount of work contemplated, the nature of the
work, the number of hours reasonably anticipated, the risks
to be faced in the litigation, and the likelihood of winning
and losing .... 114
Other factors which should be considered in setting the per-
centage include:
110. As generally noted by both circuit court reports, the trial judge should not be
involved in any fee negotiations. The approval process will require a full and frank
disclosure of the strengths, and more importantly, the weaknesses, of the plaintiffs'
case. That process should include a quantification of damages, with ranges and
probabilities of obtaining a particular range. Not only do the attorney-client privilege
and zealous advocacy provisions prevent such a disclosure to the trial judge, but
defense counsel would strenuously oppose such ex parte discussions.
111. An exception could occur when, at the time of filing the complaint, counsel
have been unable to obtain adequate information concerning the amount in
controversy or the size or configuration of the class. Discovery may well reveal that,
in light of these factors, the proposed fee is too high or too low.
112. 108 F.R.D. at 256.
113. See supra note 5.
114. 108 F.R.D. at 256.
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a. The amount of and timing of the potential recovery,
and the reliability with which it may be predicted;
b. resources and experience of the lawyers;
c. responsibility and ability to advance expenses as well
as extent of expenses;
d. market factors;
e. requirements for involvement of multiple firms, as
well as the responsibilities of each firm;
f. whether sliding scales are used;
g. the identity of the defendant or defendants and the
expected opposition to the case;115 and
h. other factors unique to the case.
To maximize the benefits of a percentage fee arrangement,
it is important that the fee be established at the outset of the
case. Although no mathematical formula can be set forth for
determining the percentage, counsel should be prepared to jus-
tify the percentage by reference to these factors. A percentage
outside the 20-25 percent range should be examined closely.
3. Sliding Scales: Forbidden Fruit in the Garden of Lindy?
The circuit court reports each suggest presumptive use of
both stage and amount sliding scales."' Such scales disrupt the
parallelism of interest that is one of the primary benefits of
percentage agreements. Percentage arrangements should not
include such sliding scales unless an objective basis for their
inclusion can be demonstrated.
The theory behind stage sliding scales (by which fee per-
centages increase as the case proceeds) is that the percentage
should increase to reflect the increased labor, delay, and risk
associated with moving to the next stage of the litigation pro-
cess. Such an arrangement can serve to recognize the addi-
tional effort or delay in payment required by a trial or appeal.
However, it also tends to create the same divergence in inter-
115. One advantage of hourly based methodologies is that defense counsel with an
unlimited budget who engage in a "war of attrition" do not face counsel with a budget
limited by a percentage of the recovery. Class counsel, under hourly based
methodologies, were able to respond blow for blow with the expectation that each
hour was potentially subject to compensation. Such is not the case under a percentage
arrangement-the proportion of the fee is fixed, and a grinding defense only serves to
consume the fee. For that reason, the court should consider the identity of the
defendant or defendants (and their counsel) in approving the percentage.
116. See supra note 11. See also supra text accompanying note 87.
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est between counsel and the class for which hourly based
methodologies have been criticized.
For example, if a stage sliding scale increases in the per-
centage if the case is not resolved prior to trial, it creates an
artificial incentive to delay settling the case. Counsel may
receive an acceptable settlement offer well before trial, but
believe the same offer will be available after the start of the
trial. Because of the increase in percentage, the stage sliding
scale may encourage counsel to delay settlement until after the
commencement of the trial. The result would be a waste of
resources of the parties, the court, and the witnesses. The class
incurs a delay in getting its funds, for which it must pay a
higher fee.117
Recognition that stage sliding scales create an incentive to
delay resolution of the case was perhaps the reason the Third
Circuit recommended use of an incentive based on a quick and
efficient resolution of the litigation."' Again, such an incen-
tive creates a divergence of interests as substantial as those
existing under Lindy. First, stage sliding scales typically
increase percentages the further the case progresses. The
Third Circuit's recommendation of incentives for quick disposi-
tion would seem to turn this provision on its head by offering
increased percentages at the early stage of the case. Such an
arrangement could also exacerbate a frequent criticism of per-
centage fees: in a prompt disposition, the lawyer gets too
much. Second, the "incentive arrangements" create the flip
side of the above conflict, by encouraging acceptance of "quick
and dirty" offers. Counsel may believe that an offer would be
improved by pursuing discovery, motions, or trial. A fee agree-
ment weighted in favor of early settlement encourages accept-
ance of the lower offer because the attorney's own interest is
served: she receives a higher percentage, without the risk, bur-
den or delay of proceeding with the case." 9 Once again, the
class loses: it gets a smaller settlement and pays a higher fee.
117. It also seems appropriate to ask whether such a system again puts the class
cart before the fee horse. If the case should not be taken to trial based on the pre-trial
fee percentage, one must ask whether the class is served by proceeding to trial.
118. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 256. The Ninth Circuit Report describes
as "challenging" the issue of adequately compensating counsel for a rapid and efficient
disposition of the case. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 8, at 9. This factor appeared
to be key in its endorsement of percentage arrangements. Id. at 10.
119. The defense will be aware of this leverage, for the fee arrangement will be




Recovery sliding scales which decrease the percentage of
the fee as the amount recovered increases, are based on the
concept that the marginal cost of obtaining the first dollar of
recovery is significantly higher than the marginal cost of
obtaining an additional dollar of the recovery. It may cost one
hundred dollars to collect the first dollar of recovery, and ten
cents to obtain the five millionth dollar of recovery. 120 In addi-
tion, as the total recovery goes up, a flat percentage can create
a huge fee. A one-third fee percentage on a million dollar
recovery may result in a reasonable fee; a one-third fee per-
centage on a hundred million dollar recovery is much more
likely to be unreasonable.
Two related factors need to be considered in the use of
recovery sliding scales: (1) the percentage fee on obtaining the
"last" dollar of recovery for the class cannot be reduced below
the cost to counsel of producing that last dollar; and (2) coun-
sel should have an adequate incentive to maximize the recov-
ery. Decreasing the percentage diminishes counsel's incentive
to pursue vigorously the maximum recovery.12' In light of the
difficulty in calculating the "cost" of pursuing the last dollar of
recovery, the agreement should err on the side of well compen-
sating counsel on the last dollar obtained.
In a case in which the recovery is relatively liquidated or
predictable (e.g., a claim for back pay, or with respect to a
security that has been rendered worthless), there does not
seem to be a great need for a variable percentage depending
upon the amount recovered. Rather, a flat percentage based
upon the relatively settled estimate of the amount at stake
seems appropriate. Such a percentage would be lower than the
120. It should be noted, however, that after a point, the marginal cost of
recovering another dollar in settlement will begin to rise again and will eventually
exceed the marginal benefit to be gained by doing so. It is at this point that a rational
attorney would settle.
121. Consider, for example, two alternative fee arrangements. One provides for a
flat 15% fee. The other, using a recovery sliding scale, provides for a fee of 40% on the
first hundred thousand dollars of recovery, 30% on the next four hundred thousand
dollars, 20% on the next five hundred thousand dollars, 10% on the next million
dollars, and 5% on any amounts recovered in excess of two million dollars. The
recovery under the sliding scale fee will be greater than the flat percentage fee until
the recovery exceeds 2.6 million dollars.
If a settlement offer of 2.5 million dollars is received, counsel has three times the
incentive under the flat fee arrangement as opposed to the recovery sliding scale
arrangement to pursue a 2.6 million dollar recovery. Counsel may well have difficulty
justifying slavish efforts to increase the recovery if the recovery sliding scale has so
diminished the marginal benefit of those efforts.
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sliding scale would provide on the lower part of the recovery,
but perhaps somewhat higher than the sliding scale percentage
at the upper end of the recovery.
When the amount in dispute is not liquidated (e.g., an anti-
trust recovery dependent upon market conditions), the recov-
ery may be estimated within a range, or it may not be subject
to a reasonable estimate at all. In the former situation, a flat
percentage may be negotiated, with the fee reliably predicted.
In the latter, the range of fee cannot be reliably predicted, and
a recovery sliding scale may be appropriate. It bears noting,
however, that when damages are relatively uncertain, a fee
agreement that well-compensates the last dollar of recovery
will create the greatest incentive for counsel to pursue the
maximum recovery for the class.
Sliding scales are not inherently unuseful. They do, how-
ever, encourage the very problems that led to the creation of
the Third Circuit Task Force and Ninth Circuit Committee-
management of litigation based on fee ramifications as opposed
to maximizing the substantive recovery. A flat percentage,
determined at the outset of the case, makes the interests of
counsel and the class parallel: the fee will be maximized by
maximizing the substantive recovery.
4. The Problem of Competing Lawyers
Perhaps the most difficult problem in class action cases
arises when several lawyers vie for the same work. The
response under the hourly based methodologies was simple,
but highly undesirable-too many lawyers would participate,
requiring overstaffing, bureaucracy, undue monitoring of each
others' work, and infighting. Typically, all counsel seek com-
pensation for all hours worked.
Over-lawyering will be less likely to happen under a prop-
erly managed percentage arrangement. Under a percentage
arrangement, the fee "pie" is not unlimited: it is strictly
defined. Latecomers face a substantial risk that they will not
be compensated at all for tardy and unnecessary efforts.
Bureaucracy and duplication are not rewarded by a compensa-
tion system that is not based on hours logged.
However, a percentage fee arrangement requires strong
management of resources. While such management will pre-
sumably do away with armies of lawyers, it makes much more
difficult the task of selecting the "manager." The Third Cir-
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cuit would have competitors for representation present their
proposals to another lawyer, who would make recommenda-
tions to the court on financial and representational matters.
When a case can be handled by one firm or a cooperating
group of lawyers, the court (and not an appointed lawyer)
should decide which "entity" will represent the class. The
question of adequacy of counsel is reserved to the court under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4), and presents issues
with which courts are fully familiar. Representation battles,
unseemly as they become, are best presented on the record and
to the court.
In cases requiring representation by multiple firms,1 22 the
attorneys should attempt to agree on division of responsibility
and fees. If the firms are brought together before filing the
complaint, this can be expected. When the firms cannot agree,
the court must intervene; maybe surprisingly, many of the
hourly based problems re-emerge.
There are a variety of means of dividing fees among law-
yers: prearranged percentages, pro rata allocations based on
hours, or percentages after deduction of hours.'23 Payment of
percentages of the total award without regard to hours will
encourage firms to attempt to shift as much work to the others
as possible, and will result in disagreement over who is respon-
sible for a given task. Methods that factor in hours will lead to
as many questions concerning churning, padding, and reasona-
bleness as hourly based methodologies.1 24 Given the analysis
above, when firms cannot agree, it is probably best for the
court to allocate and delineate responsibility as clearly as possi-
ble with compensation based on percentages.1
25
The decision maker also will be faced with the difficult
task of establishing and applying criteria for evaluating com-
122. For whatever reason: sheer size, risk of loss conflicts, sub-classes, or
geographic factors.
123. In the Agent Orange litigation, counsel arrived at a formula (later abandoned)
in which 50% of the total fee was divided in equal shares to the participants, 30% was
divided based on hours expended, and 20% was divided based on quality and risk
multipliers as approved by a vote of counsel. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987).
124. It should be observed, however, that plaintiffs' counsel will have a strong self-
interest in policing unnecessary hours or churning, given the overall limitation on the
fee. Such an interest is weaker under hourly based arrangements, for extra hours gore
no one's ox but the class'.
125. It is advisable for counsel to submit any unusual allocation of fee and expense
recoveries to the court. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987) (fees based in part
on amounts advanced for expenses).
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peting proposals from various firms. This task may involve
selecting one firm as manager of the litigation, or a group of
firms as the lawyers for the class. Fee arrangements should be
one, but not the only, factor considered. The class must be rep-
resented by qualified counsel. The firm should demonstrate a
willingness and ability to devote the time and attention the
case deserves. Firm size and capital (assuming the firm will be
required to advance costs or if the case is expected to be pro-
tracted) must be considered. Prior experience, results, and
effectiveness are other factors to which the court should give
consideration as well.2 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to explore the
problems that have been identified with hourly based method-
ologies. Contingent fee arrangements should result in lower
fees and larger recoveries. They will also reduce the cost to
the parties and the court system, promoting certainty in, and
good management of, hard cases. It serves as a lesson that
sometimes the best solutions are found in the common law.
126. One method of selecting class lawyers is that the court should select the
"qualified" firm or group of firms that will undertake the case for the lowest fee.
Another method would be to select the proposal that the court believes will offer the
best "net" return (recovery less fees and costs) to the class. The firm that can
maximize the recovery may also charge the highest fee. The Third Circuit seemed to
adopt this latter approach, by seeking recommendations concerning both economics
and effectiveness of the representation. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 256.
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